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 As the distribution of economic activity has gone global, the city-system has also gone 
global – meaning that cities now compete on a global terrain. That means that bigger 
and more competitive economic units … have superseded cities as the real engines of 
the global economy. (Florida 2008, 42) 
 
Introduction: In what sense a city-regional world?1 
 
The past decade has been dominated by discourses affirming a resurgence of city-regions in 
globalization. Part and parcel of this discourse is a growing appreciation that city-regions are 
emerging as the primary spatial scale at which competing political and economic agendas are 
convened, not least those pertaining to increasing competitiveness, while simultaneously 
tackling entrenched inequalities, encouraging progressive planning, and enabling piecemeal 
democratic rights. Ever since Allen Scott’s (2001a) edited collection Global City-Regions - Trends, 
Theory, Policy conceptually mapped and empirically demonstrated the emergence of “global” 
city-regions as a new kind of critically important geography and institutional phenomenon on 
the world stage, city-regions have been revered as the pivotal societal formation in advanced 
globalization. According to Scott and his acolytes city-regions represent a new scale of 
urbanisation and city-regionalism a new phase in capitalist territorial development - a belief 
fuelled by recognition that while accelerating processes of global economic integration and 
rapid urbanization are resulting in the resurgence of cities in globalization, substantive 
expressions of urbanization result in metropolitan landscapes stretching far beyond their 
traditional territorial boundaries. One only has to look at the exceptional rate of city expansion 
into larger city-regions comprising multiple functionally interlinked urban settlements in China, 
for example, to appreciate how “the city” as traditionally conceived no longer adequately 
reflects the underlying structure of how urban life is being organized in globalization.  
Cognizant with this is the recognition that city expansion into globalizing city-regions is 
serving to increasingly challenge existing urban economic infrastructures and urban-regional 
governance (Harrison 2011). Reliant on increasingly outdated and inadequate institutional 
structures, infrastructures, territorialities, statutory frameworks, and supports, the requirement 
for more “appropriate” - generally accepted to mean more flexible, networked, and smart - 
forms of urban and regional planning and governance arrangements has seen the new city-
regionalism mutate over the past ten years to be proxy for the officially institutionalised task of 
constructing policies, strategies, and institutions at a city-region scale.2 Stirred into action by 
these developments, accounts documenting the rise of city-regions have gone a long way to 
advance claims of a city-regional world (cf. Storper 1997), where cities at the heart of major 
urban-regional industrial production complexes constitute the “dominant leading edge of 
contemporary capitalist development” (Scott et al. 2001, 4).  
Synonymous with much of this work have been a series of normative claims relating to 
how city-regions (1) function as the basic motors of the national economic within which they 
are located, (2) are fundamental to economic and social revitalization, and (3) are vital in 
establishing effective and progressive planning and policymaking. Moreover and heavily 
inscribed in interpretations supporting notions of a city-regional world is the idea that city-
regions are quasi-autonomous functional economic spaces, increasingly acting and operating 
across and/or beyond the control of territorial structures formally administered or governed by 
nation-states. From this perspective, the strategic role and geo-economic power of major city-
regions in organizing and structuring globalized forms of capital accumulation has seen key 
proponents of the new city-regionalism posit how “global” city-regions are superseding national 
economies as the fundamental unit of capitalist development - a postulation which is doing 
much to push claims of an advancing city-regional world (Scott 2001a; Ohmae 2001; cf. Storper 
1997). Nonetheless, for all these accounts heroically championing the dynamism of city-regions 
in globalization, the new city-regionalism has not gone unchecked, nor has it gone on 
unchallenged. For engaged critics of the new city-regionalism, concerns have arisen over the 
theorization of city-regions, as many commentators come to question the capacity of the city-
region concept to account for current and future expressions of urban and regional change 
(inter alia Harrison 2007; Jonas and Ward 2007; Ward and Jonas 2004). Away from all the 
enthusiastic cheerleading, critics are now quick to point to “the city-region” as remaining a 
largely Delphian concept.  
Placing the city-region concept under the microscope is thus becoming increasingly 
central to contemporary urban-regional debates, and the starting point for this chapter. At root 
the city-region is not a new concept; what is new is the way the concept is being applied to take 
account of the contemporary urban condition, characterized by unprecedented expansion in 
the size, scale, scope, and reach of the city. Under the umbrella of the new city-regionalism, 
what we have witnessed is the production of a renewed spatial vocabulary for conceptualizing 
cities and regions, urban and regional change. Surveying the literature on new city-regionalism 
reveals a proliferation of new terms and concepts conjured up to assist in the theorization of 
these large-scale and complex urban formations. Included are various derivatives, extensions, 
and alternatives to the traditional theorization of city-regions (see next section), with prominent 
examples being: global city-region (Scott 2001a); world city-region (Kunzmann 1998); mega city-
region (Xu and Yeh 2010); polycentric mega city-region (Hall and Pain 2006); mega region 
(Florida 2008); metro region (OECD 2007); metropolitan region (Brenner 2002); polycentric 
metropolis (Hall and Pain 2006); urban region (Meijers 2005); mega urban region (Douglass 
2000); polynuclear urban region (Turok and Bailey 2004); super urban area (Harrison 2013); 
cross-border metropolitan region (Harrison and Growe 2012); new megalopolis (Knox and Lang 
2008); and, megapolitan region (Lang and Dhvale 2005).  
Now, if you are an advocate of the new city-regionalism, all of this frantic 
conceptualization activity can appear to further emphasize the rise of city-regions as the new 
and critically important geographical and institutional phenomenon on the world stage (cf. 
Lovering 1999; endnote 1). Yet for engaged critics, these and other more recent extensions to 
the city-region concept are doing much to disturb the surety many of us have in writing about 
and working with city-regions in general, and the city-region concept in particular. With many 
city-regionalists failing to adequately outline conceptually or empirically define the “city-region” 
at the heart of their inquiry, critics have been quick to suggest how the city-region has remained 
an “object of mystery” in many accounts pertaining to a new city-regionalism (Harrison 2007). 
Nevertheless and responding to this, we can - broadly speaking - identify three analytical 
conceptions of the city-region in the new city-regionalism. These are: (1) the agglomeration 
model, inspired by the ‘new economic geography’ and adopted by Allen Scott and his acolytes, 
where city-regions are conceived as “dense polarised masses of capital, labour, and social life 
that are bound up in intricate ways in intensifying and far-flung extra-national relationships. As 
such, they represent an outgrowth of large metropolitan areas - or contiguous sets of 
metropolitan areas - together with surrounding hinterlands of variable extent which may 
themselves be sites of scattered urban settlements” (Scott 2001b, 814); (2) a scale model 
rooted in the traditions of political science and public policy, which considers city-regions to be 
“a strategic and political level of administration and policy-making, extending beyond the 
administrative boundaries of single urban local government authorities to include urban and/or 
semi-urban hinterlands” (Tewdwr-Jones and McNeill 2000, 131); and (3) a relationally-
networked hub and spokes model which presupposes the city-region to be “a functionally inter-
related geographical area comprising a central, or core city, as part of a network of urban 
centres and rural hinterlands. A little bit like the hub (city) and the spokes (surrounding 
urban/rural areas) on a bicycle wheel” (UK Government 2005, 1). Indeed it could be usefully 
argued that two of these conceptual constructs reflect the editors’ own understanding of the 
need to approach the city-region “as the product of global urbanization” (agglomeration) and as 
a concept by which “novel spatial alignments of cities and global networks are being imagined” 
(hub and spokes) (Jones et al., this volume, 4).Against this backdrop, what this chapter shows is 
how the city-region has been actively constructed to be this “chaotic” concept (cf. Sayer 1992), 
where we are left with multiple theorizations of the city-region concept after ten years of the 
new city-regionalism. From the outset it should be noted that this focus on the city-region as a 
“chaotic” concept is not to suggest that multiple theorizations of the city-region concept is 
necessarily problematic, rather, it is to enunciate how these contrasting theorizations of the 
city-region concept are the result of how city-regions are constructed politically - a direct 
response to a particular set of challenges, needs, ambitions, and desires which vary in different 
place-specific contexts. What this chapter highlights is how city-regions and the city-region 
concept are being actively constructed according to the need to make these new urban 
economic spaces, with their new governance and planning arrangements, compatible with 
existing forms of territorially-embedded state spatial/scalar organization. In other words, the 
task to make city-regions complementary with existing forms of local, regional, and national 
state spatial organisation requires different constructions of the city-region concept to be 
developed at different scales, in different places, and at different times to secure the overall 
coherence of state spatial/scalar organisation.  
In writing this chapter, the aim is to use this platform to affirm how the how the process 
by which city-regions are defined, delimited, and designated is a deeply political act – one which 
is ultimately dependent on the actors involved, the purpose for which the ‘city-region’ concept 
is mobilised, and the context-specific obstacles posed by this mobilisation. Indeed, as the 
contributions to this collection exemplify, the mobilisation of the ‘city-region’ concept as inter 
alia competitive space, planning space, resilient space, functional space, a space for place-
marketing, or space for political and community engagement, highlights the diversity and 
plurality of approaches to city-regionalism (Jones et al., this volume). It is not surprising to 
recognise that what we collectively refer to as ‘city-regionalism’ is actually the product of an 
amalgamation of different disciplinary perspectives (economic geography, planning, political 
science, sociology) and discursive frames. Capturing a flavour of this, to develop this argument 
that the process of city-regionalism is a deeply political act, the chapter presents “in 
retrospect,” “in snapshot,” and “in prospect” perspectives on theorizing the city-region.  
 City-regions “in retrospect” 
 
At the beginning of [the twentieth] century, there were just sixteen cities in the world 
with more than a million people. Most were in the advanced capitalist countries and 
London, by far the largest of them all, had just under seven million. At the beginning of 
[the twentieth] century too, no more than seven percent of the world’s population could 
reasonably be classified as ‘urban.’ (Harvey 2000, 38) 
 
The term “city-region” was first coined at the beginning of the last century. In fact we can trace 
the city-region concept all the way back to 1905 and the work of Patrick Geddes, a pioneering 
Scottish planner and one of the founding fathers of modern city and regional planning. Geddes’ 
contribution to developing the city-region concept comes from his studies of Glasgow at the 
turn of the twentieth century, and his observation that there was an outpouring of population 
beyond the bounded city such that the city was devouring small towns and boroughs as it went 
- an early precursor for Scott’s agglomeration model perhaps? Geddes contribution is further 
imbued by the fact he subsequently went on to mint neologisms such as “conurbation” and 
“megalopolis” to support his recognition, and later his argument, that the city should be studied 
in the context of the region. 
 The next major advance came in the 1930s, when the German geographer Walter 
Christaller developed central place theory, a groundbreaking theory which was to advance 
understandings of how cities function as systems of cities, rather than as single entities 
functioning in isolation (Christaller 1933). Like Geddes, Christaller recognised the importance of 
relationships between cities and their regional hinterlands, albeit this time in the context of the 
predominantly rural parts of southern Germany. For Christaller, it was the economic 
relationships of cities with their regional hinterlands that proved the foundation for developing 
the city-region concept in ways which, in part, are consistent with its use today. Furthermore, 
the model proposed by Christaller reveals the earliest indication of the three different 
approaches to conceptualising city-regions evident in the new city-regionalism. Agglomeration 
can be seen in Christaller’s recognition that population size is not necessarily synonymous with 
the importance of a settlement; rather, it is the centrality of the place which produces a 
hierarchy of urban settlements. Conceptualised for Christaller in terms of the settlements 
importance in the region around it, the difference some seventy years later is that Scott’s 
(2001a) positioning of global city-regions at the apex of a new global urban hierarchy attaches 
importance to a cities’ centrality in global circuits of capital accumulation.  
Of particular interest for the present discussion is how Christaller’s model is 
“constructed” thereafter. One of the most striking features of central place theory is Christaller’s 
use of hexagons, as opposed to circles, to enable inclusion of all areas into his model. At the 
same time this removed the challenge of dealing with potential overlap between functional 
economic areas. Particularly important in Germany, where maintaining territorial equilibrium 
has been the guiding principle of spatial planning through the twentieth century, the use of 
hexagons led to Christaller’s model having wide appeal among political elites, for it enabled the 
production of spatial policies which could be presented as territorially inclusive – indicative of 
the scale model used today (see below in the cases of England and Germany). For this reason, 
central place theory became a template for post-war national spatial planning in many 
countries,3 while the famous layouts it inspired (K = 3 marketing principle, K = 4 transport 
principle, K = 7 administrative principle) offer the classic example of a hub and spokes 
perspective on city-region relations. 
 For all this, however, it is the geographer Robert Dickinson who is seen by many to be 
the founding father of the city-region concept. Inspired by Geddes and Christaller among 
others, and drawing together evidence from the United States, France, Germany, and Britain, 
Dickinson’s books The City-Region in Western Europe (1964) and City and Region: A 
Geographical Interpretation (1967) established the conceptual foundations which enabled the 
city-region to be presented as a distinct concept. What is most revealing about Dickinson, 
however, is that despite being the founding father of the city-region concept, he is almost 
entirely forgotten by both proponents and critics of the new city-regionalism. Why might this 
be? One major clue lies in the opening statement of City Region and Regionalism, where he 
declares, “This book is not about planning” (1947, xiii), a point he is keen to reiterate in the 
preface to City and Region: A Geographical Interpretation: “This book, like its predecessor in this 
series (City Region and Regionalism, 1947), is not about planning” (1967, xv). Written at a time 
when geography produced “town and country planners” (Taylor 1999, 8), Dickinson kicked back 
against the post-war planning consensus - underpinned by a positivist philosophy asserting how 
human behaviour could be predicted and therefore planned - choosing instead to pursue a 
more constructivist approach: what today would amount to an incipient form of “relational” 
approach to theorizing the city and region.  
Bucking the popular trend of the time did leave Dickinson somewhat isolated from his 
peers, a stance which has led his contemporaries to contend that “when the great upsurge of 
interest and work in urban geography began in the 1950s, Dickinson was little more than a 
footnote to these major shifts in the practice of geography, though his work may have initially 
influenced (either directly or indirectly) some of the next generation of urban pioneers” 
(Johnston 2002, 720)4. Dickinson’s two books were universally castigated for being inter alia 
“too long” and “indigestible” (ibid., 721). It is hardly surprising then that scholars writing about 
the new city-regionalism some forty years later have been guilty of overlooking Dickinson’s 
contribution, other than the usual perfunctory reference to acknowledge his minting of the 
term “city-region” that is. But in overlooking Dickinson, today’s researchers have neglected his 
great contribution to what remains the cornerstone of our understanding of the city-region 
concept - namely, that city-regions are socially and politically constructed. As he was to 
eloquently put it in his 1967 book: 
 
This concept of the city-region, like all concepts, is a mental construct. It is not, as some 
planners and scholars seem to think, an area that is presented on a platter to suit their 
general needs. The extent of the area they need will depend on the specific purpose for 
which it is required. The concept of the city-region can only be made specific and 
definable, as a geographic entity, by reference to the precise and areal extent of 
particular associations with the city. (Dickinson 1967, 227) 
 
Nevertheless, not even the attacks on planning and the assumptions underpinning 
1960s spatial science - including work from geographers embracing a humanist perspective to 
advance ideas on the social construction of place and the emergence of a post positivist 
paradigm (e.g. Entrikin, 1976) - could rescue Dickinson’s ideas and bring them back into 
mainstream geography.5 The city-region concept was to become largely invisible in the lexicon 
of academics and policy elites during the 1970s and on into the 1980s, due in large part to the 
rise of globalization and a consensus suggesting how advances in technology and 
communication would induce an era of global deconcentration and deterritorialisation, 
characterised by a diminishing role for cities. Furthermore, the rapid decline of those major 
industrial cities which had benefited most from the Fordist growth dynamic (for example, 
Dortmund and Essen in the Ruhr district of Germany, the “snowbelt” cities of Detroit and 
Pittsburgh in northeastern United States, and Liverpool and Manchester in the north of 
England), resulting in mass unemployment, unprecedented levels of social upheaval, and 
general urban decay saw the attention of academics and policy elites switch from the regional 
relations and functionality of these once great industrial cities to the crises unfolding in their 
inner core. 
 
City-regions “in snapshot” 
 
By the year 2000 there may well be as many as 500 cites with more than a million 
inhabitants while the largest of them, Tokyo, Sao Paulo, Mumbai and possibly Shanghai 
(though the list is perpetually being revised both upwards and downwards), will perhaps 
boast populations of more than twenty million trailed by a score of cities, mostly in the 
so-called developing countries, with upwards of ten million. Sometime early [in the 
twenty-first] century, if present trends continue, more than half of the world’s 
population will be classified as urban rather than rural. (Harvey 2000, 38) 
 
Here Harvey neatly contextualizes how the resurgence of interest in city-regions owes much to 
the changing fortune of cities in globalization. For one, the predicted decline of cities never 
materialised; in fact, quite the opposite happened. For sure globalization has rendered distance 
less of a barrier to exchange, and thereby extended our capacity to interact across space more 
freely and frequently, but as globalization advanced, the propensity for economic activity to 
cluster in dense agglomerations has delivered overwhelming evidence affirming how a select 
group of “global” cities (e.g. London, New York, Tokyo) and “metropolitan” regions (e.g. Silicon 
Valley, Baden-Württemberg, South East England) had bucked the trend of national economic 
decline to emerge as strategic territorial platforms for post-Fordist capital accumulation. Giving 
rise to the dominant “global city” (Sassen 1991) and “new regionalist” (Scott 1998; Storper 
1997) discourses of the 1990s, recognition that globalizing cities and metropolitan regions were 
bucking the trend of national economic decline fuelled the rapid acceleration in urbanisation 
witnessed at the end of the twentieth century. Less than a decade into this century and 
Harvey’s prediction that more than 50 percent of the world’s population would live in cities had 
become reality. Rather more startling is the current forecast that this will rise to 70 percent by 
2050, when the world population is estimated to be in excess of 9 billion (UNFPA 2007).  
While it is not possible here to go into depth about the drivers underpinning this wider 
context of accelerating processes of global economic integration and urbanisation, it is 
necessary to emphasise three related points. Firstly, cities and metropolitan regions have 
emerged as foci for globalized capital accumulation insofar as localised agglomeration 
economies foster and harbour the conditions, assets, and capacities upon which transnational 
capital depends. Secondly, claims that globalization is fuelling a resurgence of cities as drivers of 
competitiveness - and with it expected affluence - entices more and more people to become 
urban dwellers, meaning globalizing cities are spilling over their traditional “city limits.” And 
thirdly, the recognition that a globalizing city’s development is less linked to its nearby regional 
“hinterland” than to a far reaching global “hinterworld” (Taylor 2001) ensures the resurgence of 
the city-region concept to map and conceptualise the transforming metropolitan economic, 
political, and social landscape at the beginning of the twenty-first century cannot be equated 
with that minted by Dickinson, and used by others throughout the second half of the twentieth 
century, as the regional relations of the city. Reflecting on this, Kathy Pain usefully surmises how 
“confusion arises concerning what functional expansion means in theorizing this new city-region 
scale” (2011a, 84 emphasis added). 
It is precisely this confusion which prompted Allen Scott and colleagues to develop the 
concept of the “global” city-region (Scott 2001a). In an extension of the logic which saw global 
cities defined by their external linkages during the 1900s (Sassen 1991), global city-regions are 
defined in this century by the external and internal dynamics that shape them (Hall 2001). From 
this perspective, it could be suggested that the defining feature of theorizing the global city-
region is actually the bringing back of Dickinson’s ideas on the regional relations of the city to 
contemporary studies of cities in globalization. Adding weight to this argument is the 
recognition that much work on the theorization of these spatial formations is being led by a 
group of predominantly UK geographers who advocate the need for a more radically 
“relational” approach to the conception of cities and regions (Allen and Cochrane 2007, 2011; 
Allen et al. 1998; Amin 2004; Massey 2007). One particular reading of this emerging relational 
approach is particularly noteworthy for revealing much the same observation recorded by 
Dickinson some three decades previous, vide licit: 
 
[Regional] studies are always done for a purpose, with a specific view. Whether 
territorial, political, cultural or whatever, there is always a specific focus. One cannot 
study everything, and there are multiple ways of seeing a place: there is no complete 
‘portrait of a region’. Moreover, … ‘regions’ only exist in relation to particular criteria. 
They are not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; they are our (and others’) 
constructions.” (Allen et al. 1998, 2) 
 
Unlike Dickinson though, Allen et al.’s (1998) book Rethinking the Region was very well 
received, with the above quote oft cited in contemporary urban and regional studies as 
signifying a substantive expression of the underlying mantra of a reconstructed and re-theorised 
late-twentieth century regional geography centred on regions (and regional space) as the 
outcome of social relations/processes.6 What makes Allen et al.’s (1998) contribution all the 
more important in this discussion is the overall aim “to conceptualize the geography of growth 
… and in so doing review how regions are made and remade over space and time” (viii-ix, 
original emphasis).  
Analysing the dynamics and geography of growth within south east England - pivotal 
region of the 1980s Thatcherite “neoliberal growth project,” and England’s only authentic 
“global” city-region - Allen et al.’s study revealed how regions and regional space are the 
product of “stretched out” social relations/processes. By comparing maps illustrating the 
distribution of different social and economic indicators (e.g. earning, income, house prices, 
employment, national government spend, trade, and investment flows) Allen et al. were able to 
demonstrate how social relations/processes do not easily equate with an “area,” making it a 
challenge to map them, and have their own “regional” geography, making the task of pinning 
down “the region” incredibly difficult. Their analysis went on to show that the boundaries of a 
region change depending on which social relations/processes are the focus of attention and 
rarely do they coincide with the actual politico-administrative unit of regional government. 
Moreover, where the process of city expansion into globalizing city-regions is occurring, 
networks of social relations/processes stretch across and increasingly beyond the boundaries of 
sub-national political and administrative units.  
Relating this back to the city-region concept, the intellectual lineage taking us from Allen 
et al.’s (1998) exposition of the dynamics and geography of growth in a globalizing city-region 
(south east England) to Scott’s development of the global city-region concept is clearly not a big 
leap, evidenced by the following quote taken from the introduction to Global City-Regions – 
Trends, Theory, Policy: 
 
[T]he geographic structure of these networks [of social relations/processes] tends more 
and more to override purely political boundaries so that they are increasingly free from 
regulatory supervision on the part of national states. (Scott 2001, 4)7 
 
Where Allen et al. were concerned with analysing accelerating processes of global 
economic integration with geographic differentiation (e.g. uneven development, class, labour, 
ethnic and gender dimensions), to understand the dynamics and geography of (urban-regional) 
growth, Scott’s endeavour to develop the concept of the “global city-region” derived from his 
motivation to (1) promote the “new regionalism” as an alternative to the hyper-globalist view of 
the world as a borderless space of flows, and (2) put “global city-regions firmly on the analytical 
and policy agendas” as exemplars of regional socioeconomic formations which are less 
subservient to the dictates of the central state than older regionalisms (Scott 2001a, xiv). The 
latter point is particularly revealing. On the one hand, it revealed the rationale behind the claim 
that city-regionalism is a new phase of post-national capitalist territorial development. Yet on 
the other hand, it exposed to critics how Scott’s motivations led him and his followers to 
overstate the decline in the power of the nation-state vis-à-vis the emergent power structures 
of globalizing city-regions, and overplay the “smooth transition” to a city-regional world implied 
in much work on the new city-regionalism (see Ward and Jonas 2004).  
Although there is much to admire in the work on the new city-regionalism, in the first 
instance critics have been able to demonstrate how in all but a select few truly “global” city-
regions the state retains the propensity to remain orchestrator-in-chief, shaping city-regions – 
their policies, governance and planning arrangements, powers, and functions - in ways that 
enable it to protect its own legitimacy for maintaining regulatory control and management of 
the economy. Moreover and related to this, state theorists have demonstrated how new urban 
and regional spaces of planning and governance are emerging alongside, rather than replacing, 
extant territorial units of state spatial/scalar organization in globalization. As Neil Brenner, one 
of the most consistently insightful scholars on this aspect of state spatial/scalar organisation 
expedites: 
 
The rescaling of state power never entails the creation of a ‘blank slate’ on which totally 
new scalar arrangements could be established, but occurs through a conflictual 
‘layering’ process in which emergent rescaling strategies collide with, and only partially 
rework inherited landscapes of state scalar organization. (Brenner 2009a, 134)8 
 
What we have arrived at then is the crux of understanding the city-region concept and 
how it has evolved under the new city-regionalism. Despite all the bravado of city-regions being 
competitive territories par excellence, free from the shackles of regulatory control, city-regions 
and their more networked planning and governance arrangements have to be constructed to 
“fit” extant structures of state spatial/scalar organization, which are historically and territorially 
articulated and embedded. Current debate therefore centres on understanding the space-times 
in which these new networked forms of urban-regional governance complement, contradict, 
overlap, or compete with inherited patterns and structures of sociospatial organisation 
(Harrison 2012b). What this research is beginning to show is how different constructions of the 
“city-region” concept are being mobilized in different places, at different scales, and at different 
times to make more networked urban-regional planning and governance arrangements 
compatible with extant forms of territorial state spatial/scalar organization. Illustrative of this is 
how distinct brands of city-regionalism have evolved over the past ten years, with the 
contrasting evolution of city-regionalism in England and Germany offering one such illustration. 
 
The evolution of city-regionalism in England 
England was thrust to the forefront of attempts to construct more flexible and networked forms 
of urban-regional governance following the collapse of plans to establish elected regional 
government in 2004. In vogue among policy elites, city-regions emerged to fill the resulting 
policy gap with the outcome being a series of initiatives designed to operate across a variously 
defined city-region scale (Harrison 2012a). England’s love affair with all things city-regional is 
perhaps best evidenced by The Northern Way, a highly ambitious growth strategy stretching 
across three administrative regions, centred on eight hierarchically differentiated but 
functionally connected city-regions in the north of England. Indicative of how the new city-
regionalism became an officially institutionalised task, the Northern Way Growth Strategy saw 
city-regions constructed according to Scott’s agglomeration model, presented city-regions as 
competitive territories par excellence free from the shackles of regulatory control, and 
purported a smooth transition with city-regions (networked governance) replacing regions 
(territorial governance). The spatial map of the Northern Way offers the perfect illustration of 
this, especially the magical disappearance of extant regions (Figure 1). Further reinforcement of 
these points came when regional institutions, themselves swept up by the city-regionalism 
hype, began producing individual regional spatial strategies privileging networks as the most 
appropriate perspective for regional economic development (see Harrison 2010). 
Nonetheless, the can-do bravado of the new city-regionalism experienced a very short 
honeymoon period in England. Scott’s agglomeration model was jettisoned in favour of the 
scale model9 with new initiatives (e.g. City Development/Economic Development Companies 
and Multi-Area Agreements - both launched in 2006) framed as mechanisms by which to 
increase cross-territorial and inter-territorial alliances, and thereby extend planning and 
governance arrangements beyond the administrative boundaries of single urban local 
government authorities. In the case of the Northern Way, responsibility for the programme was 
devolved in a matter of weeks from the central state to a steering group led by institutions from 
each of the three regions - a move which tasked regional institutions with the challenge of how 
to make compatible their day-to-day statutory responsibilities for delivering effective regional 
governance across their territorially defined region whilst at the same time developing new 
networked governance and planning arrangements which transcend regional and sub-regional 
boundaries. What regional institutions quickly realized is although they were able to retain the 
agglomeration model when working together on the “pan-regional” vision of eight functionally 
related city-regions operating across their three regions, when it comes to working as individual 
regions, the agglomeration model is not compatible with delivery of their statutory 
responsibilities of coordinating economic development to make regions more competitive while 
spreading economic prosperity and opportunity to everyone. This is evidenced most clearly by 
the individual regional spatial strategies produced during this period.  
If we take the North West region as our example, at the zenith of city-region orthodoxy 
in England, the Regional Spatial Strategy produced in 2006 had all the hallmarks of the new city-
regionalism. The agglomeration model was deployed to spatially select the three Northern Way 
city-regions as pivotal societal and political-economic formations; lines demarcating existing 
forms of territorial organization were airbrushed out, networked forms of regional governance 
did not conform to any known political or administrative unit, and the concept of fuzzy 
boundaries was promoted, as no line on the map reflected any known politico-administrative 
units, with the most prominent lines on the map referring to international, national, and 
regional connectivity. In short, the North West was now represented and defined as a 
relationally networked space of flows, a reflection on how networks of social 
relations/processes stretch across and increasingly beyond the boundaries of the region as a 
political and administrative unit (cf. Allen et al. 1998). Nevertheless, by the time of the 2008 
Regional Spatial Strategy, conceptualising the region as a relationally networked space had been 
jettisoned. Indicative of this was how the three Northern Way city-regions were now defined by 
hard, unambiguous lines and mapped directly onto known politico-administrative units with no 
gaps or overlaps - the most prominent line on the map now being the regional boundary, while 
connections beyond the region were downplayed in favour of inter- and intra-regional 
connections. Important to our present discussion is how the agglomeration model for 
conceptualising city-regions had clearly been jettisoned in favour of the scale model - a 
reflection of the process which has taken place in the North West, and England as a whole, to 
try to make more networked governance spaces compatible with extant territorial structures of 
state spatial organisation. 
To understand how and why different conceptions of the city-region have been 
employed across different spaces, at different scales, and at different times in England, we need 
to reflect how: (1) the theoretical rationale for city-regions lends itself to the agglomeration 
model, but the political rationale for city-regions - particularly in England where city-region 
policies were aimed at rectifying weak cross-boundary urban governance, poor horizontal 
coordination, and a lack of policy integration across local government authorities - lends itself to 
the scale model; (2) city-regions are initially designated according to an economic logic (the 
agglomeration model), however, the marking out of city-regions as spaces of governance and/or 
planning is determined more by local territorial politics (the scale model) than any relationally 
networked economic rationale (Harrison 2010); (3) the agglomeration model produces overlaps 
and gaps which prove politically sensitive - particularly where areas fall in the gaps - whereas 
the scale model can be seen to overcome much of this; (4) many of these new networked 
spaces of urban-regional planning and governance are in fact a scalar amplification or 
contraction of previous territorial forms of state scalar organisation; they are therefore neither 
as “new” nor as “networked” as many proponents of city-regions would have us believe (Lord 
2009); and (5) regional institutions, under direct supervision of the central state, have played a 
pivotal role in orchestrating city-region development in ways which maintained their role as 
coordinators of regional economic development while at the same protecting the state’s 
legitimacy for maintaining regulatory control and management of the economy (Harrison 
2012a).  
With this in mind, the latest “city-region” initiative to be launched is specifically 
designed to overcome many of these barriers. Launched in June 2010 amid a crescendo of 
enthusiastic grandstanding, Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) are the latest initiative designed 
to operate across a functional, rather than administrative, geography in England. Signalling the 
incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government’s preferred model for sub-
national economic development, planning, and governance, LEPs are significant in that 
alongside their launch, the UK Government have dismantled aspects of the inherited landscape 
of state scalar organization by airbrushing out regions from policy and abolishing the regional 
tier of planning and governance in England. Amounting to a deliberate attempt to remove some 
of the command and control apparatus of the centralising state, LEPs were framed as part of a 
wider “localist agenda” designed to present local areas with more of a blank piece of paper on 
which to come forward with proposals for urban-regional governance that “better reflect the 
natural economic geography of the areas they serve” and can “differ across the country in both 
form and functions” (Department of Communities and Local Government 2010, 13-14). 
Nonetheless, a year after LEPs were first announced, the facts do not reflect a city-regionalism 
proponents would instantly recognize. Of England’s thirty-nine LEPs, only three have a core 
geography which is cross-regional; only four identify as being explicitly city-regional (a further 
fifteen are based on a city or cities, while seventeen identify with a country and county 
structures - an even more historically embedded territorial unit. Average population is a mere 
1.5 million, the smallest being 0.5 million (Cumbria), the largest 8.0 million (Pan London), and 
the largest outside London 3.4 million (South East). And, of 326 local authorities in England over 
90 percent are wholly within a single LEP. 
Again, a number of important points can be distilled from this. Firstly, the legacy of 
inherited structures of state scalar organisation is such that despite the UK Government 
attempting to airbrush regions from policy and abolishing the regional tier of planning and 
governance, past and present territorial units formally administered or governed by the state 
remain “active progenitors” in the form and function of new, more flexible and networked 
governance and planning arrangements (cf. Smith, 1992). From this perspective, city-regions are 
not the quasi-autonomous political-economic spaces many proponents of the new city-
regionalism would have us believe. Secondly, the lack of overlap runs counter to evidence 
showing how expansion in the size, scale, scope, and reach of city-regions in globalization 
means there are fewer clean breaks to separate one functional economic area from another 
one nearby.10 This suggests that although city-regions are designated according to their 
economic competitiveness - not unlike the rationale which saw Christaller use hexagons to avoid 
overlap and gaps in his development of central place theory - policy elites are acutely aware of 
the need, where possible, to avoid the politically thorny issue of areas falling in the gaps, 
particularly when it comes to institutionalizing structures and practices of city-region 
governance and/or planning. The result is what we might call “compromised city-regionalism” 
(Harrison 2010), with LEPs being an exemplar of how the tension, struggle, and resulting 
compromise between the economic logic for constructing new urban-regional governance and 
planning arrangements to fit functional economic areas and political claims to territory has 
produced a geography of territorially defined sub-regional, as opposed to city-regional, 
functional economic areas (Figure 2). Or, to put it another way, LEPs represent a new form of 
territorially organizing sub-national economic development which operate within, not beyond, 
central state control. 
 What the enduring role of the state - manifest in compromised city-regionalism - alerts 
us to is the critique of forced amalgamation as ill-suited to the endogenous social, political and 
economic development of city-regions which has been developed by, among others, Andrew 
Sancton. With particular reference to the Canadian context, Sancton argues that highly 
autonomous city-regions only exist in unusual circumstances (e.g. sovereign city-states) with the 
broader recognition being that in modern liberal democracies city-regions “will not and cannot 
be self-governing … [This is because] boundaries will never be static, will never to acceptable to 
all, and will always be contested” (Sancton, 2008, 3). In short, the argument is the territory over 
which city-region governance is to be enacted struggles to keep pace with the pace of urban 
expansion. From this perspective it appears there is little room for manoeuvre but recent 
analysis by Jen Nelles has taken to invoking the concept of the ‘imagined metropolis’ to present 
a counterpoint to Sancton’s argument – namely that “the central feature of city-region 
governance networks is that they are products of cooperation” (Nelles, 2012, 7). Again drawing 
heavily on the Canadian case (but Germany also) Nelles’ advances the argument that actually 
where actors have a shared image of the metropolis (or city-region) and engage at that scale, 
the willingness and capacity of local municipalities to coordinate policy and politics in pursuit of 
the collective territorial development of the region can overcome some of the barriers 
identified by Sancton. In other words, fostering relationships between local authorities can be 
achieved if and when formally  
defining, delimiting, and designating city-regions is debunked in favour of less formal, more 
dynamic and fluid governance arrangements (Glass, this volume).  
 
The evolution of metropolitan regionalism in Germany 
Metropolitan regionalism in Germany can be traced to the early 1990s and the global city 
discourse. But unlike England, which has London, Germany does not possess a global city. 
Rather it operates a polycentric “horizontal” urban system comprising cites well positioned with 
national and European circuits of capital accumulation.11 Responding to the growing rhetoric 
around the importance of cities and major urban regions in organizing and structuring 
globalized forms of capital accumulation, the federal government introduced the concept of 
European Metropolitan Region (EMR) in 1993. Between 1993 and 2005, eleven EMR were 
approved incorporating 57.98 million inhabitants (or 68.3 percent of the German population) - 
an acknowledgement that while Germany does not have an a priori global city such as London 
or Paris, it could identify what might amount to aspiring, potential, or emerging global cities. 
 The importance attached to the EMR is that a new “discursive frame” was constructed 
around the agglomeration model of city-region development. Establishing EMR created a new 
urban hierarchy in Germany, which despite not having formal powers was able to lobby state, 
national, and European actors and institutions to recognize their superior strategic importance 
within spatial planning and development policies. This and other factors - for example, greater 
European integration - saw Germany’s EMR significantly expand their functional role, 
importance, and influence through the 1990s and on into the early part of this century. Yet two 
important consequences of this were the exacerbation of already strikingly uneven spatial 
development in Germany, and the emergence of the metropolitan region discourse to challenge 
the dominant idea of regional development based on regions as political-administrative 
territorial units - points which left the federal government facing the same predicament as 
policy elites in England and other national contexts: how best to manage the contradictions, 
overlaps, and competing tendencies resulting from new forms of more networked urban-
regional planning and governance (EMR) being created alongside existing forms of state scalar 
organization - namely, the regional Länder.  
 In June 2006, and following a two-year technical and political process, the federal 
government and federal state ministers responsible for spatial planning (Landesplanung) 
published and adopted “Concepts and Strategies for Spatial Development in Germany” 
(Leitbilder und Handlungsstrategien für die Raumentwickung in Deutschland) as their new 
national spatial plan for urban and regional development (BMBVS/BBR 2006). The aim was 
simple: to advance the importance of a networked-driven approach to conceptualizing regional 
growth and competitiveness in a way that can “relate to all types of area - from rural-peripheral 
areas to metropolitan areas” to ensure spatial inclusivity (ibid., 5). But whereas in England the 
task of ensuring spatial inclusivity has seen the agglomeration model jettisoned in favour of the 
scale model, the Leitbilder retains the eleven EMR as its starting point but identifies for the first 
time two other types of networked space: growth regions outside metropolitan regions, 
predominantly rural areas accounting for a substantial share of overall economic growth due to 
the presence of dynamic clusters, medium-sized cites, and important regional centres of 
innovation and locations of specialised technology; and stabilisation areas, primarily rural or old 
industrial areas in peripheral locations or located close to borders characterised by below 
average development due to falling in-between areas of growth. The resulting spatial map 
shown in Figure 3 is particularly interesting, not least because drawing on the conceptual 
framework of Scott and others, it clearly envisions a city-regional world where trans-region 
boundary lines remain ambiguous and do not correspond to units formally administered or 
governed by the central state. 
 What marks Germany out as a pertinent case study is how policy elites responded to the 
challenges posed by establishing EMR in the period leading up to 2006 by simultaneously 
employing all three approaches to conceptualising city-regions: agglomeration to identify the 
eleven EMR as dense nodes of economic and social activity; scale to enable all areas to be 
included in what now amounts to an embryonic national spatial plan based on trans-regional 
networked forms of governance; and hub and spokes to, firstly, connect metropolitan regions to 
other dynamic clusters, medium-sized cites, and important regional centres of innovation and 
locations of specialised technology, and secondly, identify places which have some functional 
role in national circuits of capital accumulation but find themselves marginalized from European 
and global circuits of capital accumulation because they lack a larger core. The importance 
attached to this is how each approach to conceptualising the city-region is constructed to serve 
a particular political purpose: agglomeration to re-emphasise the superior strategic importance 
of the EMR for growth and competitiveness in global capital accumulation, scale to alleviate 
some of the political angst caused by the spatially selective discursive frame of EMR (a case of 
“picking winners”), and hub and spokes to visually capture the importance of cooperation, 
collaboration, and exchange necessitated by both the city-region as agglomeration and city-
region as scale partitioning state space into a mosaic of regional spaces, often construed as 
leading to unfettered interregional competition.  
What does this tell us about the city-region concept? First, it reinforces this point about 
the city-region concept being bent and shaped to fit particular political agendas. We see in the 
German example how once more the starting point for city-regions, that is, their re-emergence 
in public policy discourse and their initial designation, is definitively economic and neatly 
conceptualized by the construction of the city-region as an agglomeration. Yet to sustain city-
regionalism as a political project requires compromise - compromise to ensure spatial inclusivity 
(or at least, a perception that city-regionalism is open to all), and compromise to make these 
networked spaces of governance compatible with extant territorial structures of state spatial 
organisation. On the former, where the England example showed how this compromise has 
seen the agglomeration model jettisoned in favour of the scale model, Germany is currently 
experimenting with the idea that political compromise can be achieved in and through the 
perceived complementarities of the three different approaches to conceptualizing city-regions 
and city-region development. On the latter, what we do not see in the Leitbilder is the 
compromise to make these networked spaces of governance compatible with extant territorial 
structures of state spatial organization. On first viewing, and like many city-region initiatives, the 
Leitbilder present these new networked spaces as emerging onto a “blank slate” (cf. Brenner 
2009) - note the complete absence of the regional Länder. This is important to understandings 
of city-regions and how they are being constructed in the German case. Albeit appearing to 
amount to an embryonic national spatial plan based on more networked and flexible urban and 
regional spaces, the first important point to highlight is that EMR and their derivatives remain 
discursive frames. Planning competencies remain ostensibly at the federal level with any ceding 
of powers to EMR tightly regulated by the Länder. Following on from this, although important 
territorial units such as the Länder are noticeably absent in the Leitbilder one territorial unit 
remains very prominent - Bundesrepublik Deutschland: the Federal Republic of Germany. What 
this amounts to is that: 
 
… although the Federal State are accepting of the need to think beyond the narrow 
confines of territorial bound politico-administrative units within the national context … 
there is an unwillingness at this point to consider such practices when it involves 
collaboration with areas that lie beyond the national border. (Harrison and Growe 2012, 
14 original emphasis)  
 
All of this points to a corollary which is that contra Scott and key proponents of the new 
city-regionalism more generally, city-regions are not as free from the regulatory supervision of 
the central state as many would have us believe. Quite simply, the state remains the 
orchestrator of city-region development, and any claims toward a city-regional world should not 
be seen at the expense of the nation-state, but as a conduit of a state manoeuvring its activities 
in order to maintain regulatory control and management over the economy under globalizing 
conditions. 
 
City-regions “in prospect” 
 
The scale and pace of China's urbanization promises to continue at an unprecedented 
rate. If current trends hold, China's urban population will expand from 572 million in 
2005 to 926 million in 2025 and hit the one billion mark by 2030. In 20 years, China's 
cities will have added 350 million people – more than the entire population of the 
United States today. By 2025, China will have 219 cities with more than one million 
inhabitants – compared with 35 in Europe today – and 24 cities with more than five 
million people. (McKinsey Global Institute 2008, 1) 
 
When Allen Scott minted the global city-region concept, he identified cities with more than one 
million inhabitants as his starting point. Quick to admit the inadequacy of this approach to 
defining global city-regions, he did deem it sufficient for identifying which cities were worthy of 
consideration as being of superior strategic importance in advanced globalization. Only ten 
years later, this now seems remarkably outdated. In those ten years a further one billion has 
been added to world population; where there were only 272 cities with a population over one 
million in 1990, there are now 479, while China alone will have 219 cities with populations more 
than one million in less than fifteen years. Add to this the fact there will be twenty-seven 
megacities - defined as cities with populations over 10 million - by 2025, of which twenty-one 
will be in the Global South, and the future of the city-region is never more important than 
currently.  
All of the statistics presented here and elsewhere reinforce the trend of city-regions 
increasing in size, number, scale, scope, reach, influence, and importance in globalization. But it 
also points to the emergence of another trend, one which sees city-regions considered 
alongside even larger urban spaces which are home not to millions of people but to tens of 
millions of people. What we are witnessing at the beginning of this century is the emergence of 
super urban areas - vast urban landscapes which are loci for new forms of territorial 
cooperation and competition on a scale previously unimagined. Or is it? On the one hand, and 
according to the UN-HABITAT’s State of the World’s Cities Report 2010/11, these vast urban 
configurations are fast emerging as the critically important societal and political-economic 
formations for the next stage of globalization (UN-HABITAT 2011). Indeed, with a larger 
population and area than many countries, and with larger economies to boot, super urban 
areas are clearly important. But where are they, and more importantly, do they exist? 
In their biannual report, UN-HABITAT identify six super urban areas located within 
nation-states, with China alone accounting for three. The most prominent is the Pearl River 
Delta (PRD), the name given to the area around Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou, and the 
highest populated super urban area at an estimated 120 million. Albeit refuted by the 
Guangdong Provincial Authority, the prominence afforded the PRD has been accentuated of late 
by suggestions that plans are afoot to merge the nine mainland cities of the PRD to form a 
single urban metropolis in excess of 40 million people and twenty-six times larger 
geographically than Greater London (Moore and Foster 2011). Alongside the PRD are the 
Yangtze River Delta, a super urban area centred on sixteen cities (including Shanghai, Nanjing, 
and Hangzhou) covering an area of 110,115 sq. km. and with over 90 million inhabitants, and 
the Bohai Economic Rim, the urban area centred on Beijing and Tianjin which has a growing 
population of 60 million. Also identified in the UN-HABITAT report are three more nationally 
specific super urban areas. In Japan, Tokyo-Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto-Nagoya is predicted to reach a 
population of 60 million by 2015; this is double the size of the largest global city-region 
identified by Scott. A super urban area for Central Asia is said to be emerging in India along the 
1,500 km. urban corridor stretching from Jawaharlal Nehru Port in Navi Mumbai to Dadri and 
Tughlakabad in Delhi - currently home to in excess of 40 million people. Finally, Rio de Janeiro-
Sao Paulo is Brazil and South America’s super urban area based on the 430 km. urban corridor 
between the two cities which has a current population of 43 million. 
Alongside this, UN-HABITAT identify two super urban areas which transcend national 
boundaries. The first is Beijing-Pyongyang-Seoul-Tokyo, which connects China’s Bohai Economic 
Rim with Japan’s Tokyo-Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto-Nagoya super urban area. Stretched across four 
countries (China, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan), Beijing-Pyongyang-Seoul-Tokyo is a 
1,500 km. urban corridor connecting seventy-seven cities with populations over 200,000 and 
home to an aggregate population of 100 million. The second is Ibadan-Lagos-Accra (ILA), a 
potential super urban area for sub-Saharan Africa. With an expanding population in excess of 25 
million (20 million of which live in cities), the ILA urban corridor connects the cities of Ibadan, 
Lagos, Cotonou, Lomé, and Accra. Each separated by 100-125 km. and spread across four 
countries (Nigeria, Benin, Togo, and Ghana), the ILA represents the engine of West Africa’s 
expanding and industrialising economy - an economic hotspot with the potential to become a 
globally competitive urban area, according to UN-HABITAT. 
This raises a number of important points when considering the future of the city-region 
concept. Firstly, although at one level we can say super urban areas reinforce the trend of city-
regions increasing in size, number, scale, scope, reach, influence, and importance in 
globalization, the reality is that recognition of this very point is serving to fuel the search for 
these larger configurations in the belief pace Florida (2008, 42) that “bigger and more 
competitive economic units … [are] the real engines of the global economy.” What we have 
witnessed over the past decade is a search for city-regionality on an even greater scale (Hall and 
Pain, 2006; Knox and Lang, 2008; Ross, 2009). From Scott’s (2001) initial identification of global 
city-regions ranging from 1-27.9 million, we have seen the OECD (2007) refine this to seventy-
eight metro-regions ranging from 1.5-35 million, Florida (2008) construct forty megaregions 
ranging from 3.7-121.6 million, and most recently, UN-HABITAT identifying super urban areas 
currently in the range of 20-120 million, but inferring a future where the Pearl River Delta, for 
example, may reach in excess of 260 million. The reason for suggesting this to be a search for 
city-regionality is precisely because constructing large-scale multi-nodal urban complexes is 
nothing new. Lest we forget Europe’s “blue banana,” the discontinuous urban corridor of 
industrial growth stretching from north west England to northern Italy constructed in the late-
1980s to showcase the economically advantageous position of major urban regions within 
national and European circuits of capital accumulation. We can point to other long-standing 
examples (e.g. Europe’s “golden banana,” an urban corridor stretching along the Mediterranean 
coast from Valencia (Spain) in the west to Genoa (Italy) in the east, and the Singapore-Johor-
Riau growth triangle in south-east Asia) of politically constructed economic spaces which 
transcend national boundaries, as well as boundless examples of large urban complexes 
identified as being of superior strategic importance within individual national contexts.  
The simple point here is that many of these new economic spaces that have emerged 
over the past decade are only new in their identification - each being constructed as a smaller 
grouping of urban economic spaces is sought to be presented as being at the apex of a new 
global urban hierarchy of “bigger and more competitive economic units” (Florida 2008). The 
trend is one of conjoining neighbouring urban configurations to form a larger configuration 
irrespective of whether they are real or imagined geo-economic spaces. This emphasis on 
creating larger configurations and bestowing territorial coherence upon them is no more 
evident than in the identification of mega-regions by Richard Florida and super urban areas by 
UN-HABITAT. In his book, Who’s Your City, Richard Florida constructs forty mega-regions - most 
of which are the product of conjoining cities e.g. Boston-Washington - with no second-thought 
to the coherence of these large urban complexes, in particular whether new forms of territorial 
cooperation and/or conflict, bind or otherwise coalesce this purported geo-economic space into 
a coherent unit (Jonas 2011).  
Megaregions are also the focus of national debate in the United States. The Regional 
Plan Association (2006) have launched America 2050, a programme based on eleven existing (or 
emerging) megaregions where there is increasing impetus to coordinate policy at this expanded 
urban scale. What is revealing about the five criteria employed by the Regional Plan Association 
to define US megaregions – environmental systems and topography, infrastructure systems, 
economic linkages, settlement patterns and land use, shared culture and history – is the 
underlying assumption that area sharing these criteria will be a cohesive megaregion. Alongside 
this, Virginia Tech’s Metropolitan Institute has taken to defining megapolitan America, 
identifying a like-for-like representation of ten megapolitan areas (Lang and Dvale, 2005; see 
also Ross, 2009). 
Similar sentiments resonate for UN-HABITAT, but in addition, they only identify large 
urban complexes outside Europe and North America. This is despite, for example, Europe’s 
“blue banana” displaying greater functionality than those large urban complexes identified, and 
a present population in excess of 110 million making it comparable to the Pearl River Delta. In 
the case of UN-HABITAT, the rhetoric used in State of the World’s Cities Report 2010/11 is clearly 
indicative of two important points: first, the agglomeration model of city-region development 
and its promotion of ever larger urban configurations as “the new engines of global and 
regional economies” is still extremely prominent as a key policy tool in the armoury of policy 
elites (UN-HABITAT 2011); and second, the need to balance this with notions of territorial 
inclusivity, which in this case stretches to underplaying the role of large-scale agglomerations in 
the development of North America and western Europe to actively promote their prescribed 
development potential in China, South East Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and South America. 
Critically, this is showing the city-region to be a captured concept, one which is used to 
legitimize and publicize certain decisions, actions, and agendas. But as a purely discursive frame, 
it remains to be seen if anything more concrete will emerge. 
Meanwhile, and somewhat related to this, the search for city-regionality is also 
extending to the opposite end of the spectrum. For such is the political appeal of city-regions 
that smaller areas, that is, those which fall outside the scope of city-region policy because they 
do not have sufficient critical mass to be captured as an important agglomeration, are so 
desperate to be included in this policy sphere that they actively search for city-regionality. Local 
Enterprise Partnerships in England once more prove to be a useful example of this. Launched 
with the explicit intention to establish new flexible, smart, and networked forms of urban-
regional governance across a functional rather than administrative geography, one of the 
imposed criterion by government was that it would only grant approval for LEP to be 
established in areas where there was a convincing argument that the LEP reflected a “real” 
functional economic area. Nevertheless, the starting point for most LEPs was political, not 
economic, reflecting the real sense of territorial dependence among key stakeholders in 
establishing LEPs. For this was a process dominated by territorial interest groups who began 
searching for evidence of functionality/city-regionality that fits the territory unit over which 
they exercised some power. No more so is this exemplified than when seventeen out of the 
thirty-nine LEPs approved by government mapped directly onto historically embedded county 
structures. What can we take from this? First, it provides further evidence that making 
networked spaces of urban-regional governance compatible with embedded territorial forms of 
state spatial organization is being achieved by thinking relationally within, much more than 
across, territorial units. Second, it reinforces how overcoming the politically thorny issue of 
ensuring spatial inclusivity is best achieved by adopting the scale model of city-region 
development, albeit always with the rhetoric of the agglomeration model very much to the fore 
in policy discourse. Third, as Brenner (2009b, 30) rightly surmises, city-regions are not simply 
the outcome of capital accumulation strategies but “mediated through large-scale institutional 
forms (e.g. the modern state) and diverse social forces (e.g. … place- or territory-based social 
movements).” And fourth, it re-emphasizes the incredible spatial and scalar flexibility of the new 
networked spaces of governance and planning being constructed under the auspices of the new 
city-regionalism. As this section highlights, the agglomeration model is still being invoked to 
identify/construct even bigger urban-regional complexes. Yet on the other hand, where other 
constructions of city-region development are being mobilized, these new networked spaces 
remain relatively small. Expanding the city-region concept to account for all expressions of 
contemporary urban and regional change leads us to a fundamental question: do we now need 
new and more appropriate vocabularies for mapping and conceptualizing the transforming 
metropolitan economic, political, and social landscape?  
 Concluding comments: the city-region as a captured concept 
 
While no one can deny city-regions being a critically important geographical and institutional 
phenomenon on the world stage, important questions are beginning to be raised as to the 
way(s) in which the city-region concept is being constructed politically to take account of, and in 
many cases fuel, changes to urban-regional governance and planning arrangements. This 
chapter has attempted to shed light on some of the unanswered questions surrounding the new 
city-regionalism and the foundations upon which it has been/is being constructed, namely: why 
are different constructions of the city-region concept in use? What purpose(s) do different 
constructs of the city-region have? Why are different conceptions of the city-region dominant, 
emerging, or residual in different space-time configurations? What is the role of individual and 
collective agents, organizations, and institutions in orchestrating and steering contemporary 
urban and regional development through public policy and city-region strategies? What is the 
impact of their constructions of city-regions and city-region development? Who stands to 
gain/lose from different constructions of city-regions? Is what we have witnessed over the past 
decade tantamount to a city-regional world, or even a world of city-regions? 
 These are all important questions and require much greater attention than is available in 
this chapter. However, in this final section I want to briefly reflect on a few of the key points 
which have emerged from this chapter, and how they can go some way to outlining a way 
forward in deepening our understanding of city-regions, the city-region concept, and city-region 
development. The first point to really emphasize is that there are multiple ways of engaging 
with and constructing city-regions (cf. Allen et al. 1998). Indeed, much of the popular appeal of 
the city-region concept is precisely because it is this chaotic concept. Certainly the longevity of 
the city-region as a policy tool owes much to the fact it can be bent and shaped to fit place-
specific challenges, most particularly the challenge of making these new networked spaces of 
governance and planning compatible with existing forms of state spatial/scalar organisation 
which are historically and territorially embedded. It is absolutely fundamental therefore that in 
our research and work with city-regions we do not assume the city-region with which we work 
but engage with it, either by outlining conceptually or empirically defining the space over which 
political and economic power is being exercised. To reiterate, choosing which city-region 
geography and city-region concept is a deeply political act. 
 Derived from this, second, the pendulum has swung too far in the trial-and-error search 
for city-regionality. Ever since the city-region concept punctuated the popular “global city” and 
“new regionalism” discourses to emerge dominant at the beginning of this century, the 
seemingly endless search for city-regionality has stretched the city-region concept above and 
below the spatial scale of the “global city-region” originally minted by Scott as being at the 
heart of the new city-regionalism. On the one hand, the past decade has seen a mantra of 
onwards and upwards as the search for bigger economic units has been dominant. But where 
does this search stop? Have we already reached the nadir with UN-HABITAT’s super-urban 
areas? Where do we go next? On the other hand, it has been shown how the past decade has 
also seen a search for city-regionality in spaces which initially fell outside the scope of being 
city-regional in public policy. This is exemplified by the examples of England and Germany 
where all areas/spaces are now included within the scope of city-region policy, irrespective of 
whether they are urban/rural, central/peripheral or growing/lagging. How many of the spaces 
identified as city-regions today would Allen Scott recognize as city-regions vis-à-vis the original 
theoretical rationale for city-regions functioning as pivotal societal and political-economic 
formations in globalization? Contrast this with another question: how many of these “city-
regional” spaces have been constructed for other purposes (e.g. spatial inclusivity)? As we look 
back on a decade of city-regionalism, the evidence clearly favours the latter, and by some 
distance, if the examples of England and Germany are anything to go by. Moreover, it raises the 
question of whether anything concrete will ever emerge, or will many of these spaces of city-
regionalism remain purely discursive frames and abstract spaces? 
 As a direct result of this, thirdly, we are now witness to a multiplicity of city-regions, 
from the real to the imagined, from the large to the small. A defining feature of the new city-
regionalism promoted by Allen Scott was the incredible spatial and scalar flexibility of the city-
region concept; this flexibility has only increased over the past decade. The key question 
therefore is which city-region to choose? For what we have seen with the emergence of city-
regions is not just a multiplication of scales (as the city-region becomes a new strategic level 
alongside the local, urban, regional, national, supranational. etc.) but a multiplication of city-
region scales (from local to global). Deciding which city-region to choose is therefore a deeply 
political act, one which requires us to critically interrogate why some city-regional spaces are 
prioritized over others, considering all the time by whom they are constructed, and more 
important than this, for whom they are constructed.  
As Kathy Pain correctly emphasises in her account of the changing realms of globalizing 
cities (Pain 2011b), this incredible spatial and scalar flexibility also poses problems for the 
planning the mega (or global) city-region. Taking London as her example, Pain emphasizes how 
the construction of LEPs as a localist approach to city-region development poses major 
headaches for city-region development at a scale more akin to Scott’s global city-region. 
Whereas previously the global city-region of London was administered by two Regional 
Development Agencies - South East Development Agency and East of England Development 
Agency - working alongside the London Assembly and Mayor’s Office to provide overview across 
the functional economic geography of London, the abolition of the regional tier of governance 
in England leaves a large gap between centrally-orchestrated national planning and the twelve 
LEPs operating at a more local/subregional level across this bigger and more competitive city-
regional space. Stated bluntly, and indicative of a much general issue resulting from the 
incredible spatial and scalar flexibility of city-regions, Pain concludes that arrangements for 
bigger and more competitive city-region spaces “will be weaker,” not stronger, with these 
politically-orchestrated transformations to the planning and governance of globalizing cities 
(Pain 2011b).   
To briefly conclude, all spatial configurations display some degree of city-regionality, but 
whether this degree of city-regionalism is sufficient to warrant city-region status in public policy 
- widely accepted to mean of superior strategic importance - is highly debatable. For this 
reason, although there is clearly the emergence of a new urban landscape in globalization - of 
which city-regionality plays a key role in forming - this does not constitute a city-regional world. 
Nevertheless, that city-region research has remained vibrant over the past decade does suggest 
the city-region concept remains a useful tool for mapping and conceptualizing the transforming 
metropolitan economic, political, and social landscape of globalizing cities. We just need to 
remember to adequately outline conceptually or empirically define the “city-region” at the 
heart of our inquiries. 
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